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both—and in many ways South Africa has navigated the 
transition better than other post-revolutionary states. But 
it is to say that the current student and union movements 
for economic justice and internal decolonization, as well 
as movements for greater democratization, anti-corruption, 
queer liberation, and de-militarization, are both heirs to 
the prefiguration of the ANC struggle and at the same time 
movements confronting the ANC as an oppressive external 
force. 
I will stop here on the trite conclusion that prefiguration 
is hard. It is multi-dimensional, dialectical, and always an 
impure confrontation with impurity. But it is also the most 
beautiful thing we people do. Our attempts to build the 
social, psychological, and environmental capacity to be 
better, richer, more flourishing people, to build “a world in 
which many worlds can flourish,” is a constantly evolving 
project carried out by damaged people inside damaged 
social relations across complex and contested dimensions 
of solidarity and opposition. We live our prefiguration on 
multiple fronts simultaneously, whether these be teach-
ins at a campus shantytown or facing down the military in 
the streets of Soweto, whether fighting cops at Stonewall 
or figuring out how to make a queer-friendly collective 
space in our apartment, whether marching for black lives in 
Ferguson or even engaging with the brilliant work of Alexis 
Shotwell in an author-meets-critic session of the APA. 
For an Impure, Antiauthoritarian Ethics 
Michael D. Doan 
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY 
My commentary deals with the fourth chapter of Against 
Purity, entitled “Consuming Suﬀering,” where Shotwell 
invites us to imagine what an alternative to ethical 
individualism might look like in practice. I am particularly 
interested in the analogy she develops to help pull us 
into the frame of what she calls a “distributed” or “social” 
approach to ethics. I will argue that grappling with this 
analogy can help illuminate three challenges confronting 
those of us seeking a genuine alternative to ethical 
individualism: first, that of recognizing that and how certain 
organizational forms work to entrench an individualistic 
orientation to the world; second, that of acknowledging the 
inadequacy of alternatives to individualism that are merely 
formal in character; and third, that of avoiding the creation 
of organizational forms that foster purism at the collective 
level. 
THE ARGUMENT OF “CONSUMING SUFFERING” 
In “Consuming Suﬀering,” Alexis Shotwell takes aim at a 
long tradition of thought and practice rooted in ethical 
individualism, an approach to ethics that “takes as its 
unit of analysis the thinking, willing, and acting individual 
person” (109). Focusing on the complexity of our present 
circumstances as concerns energy use, eating, and climate 
change, and emphasizing our constitutive entanglement 
with countless others and, hence, our inescapable 
implication in cycles of suﬀering and death, Shotwell 
argues that “an ethical approach aiming for personal purity 
is inadequate,” not to mention “impossible and politically 
dangerous for shared projects of living on earth” (107). 
Not only is ethical individualism ill-suited to the scale of 
especially complex ecological and social problems, but it 
also nourishes the tempting yet ultimately illusory promise 
that we can exempt ourselves from relations of suﬀering 
by, say, going vegan and taking our houses oﬀ grid. Clearly, 
then, to be against such purity projects and the ethical and 
political purism underwriting them is to commit ourselves 
to uprooting individualism—a commitment that Shotwell 
puts to work in each chapter of her book. 
I find the negative, anti-individualist argument of the 
chapter quite convincing. Having developed related 
arguments in a series of papers focused on collective 
inaction in response to climate change,1 I also appreciate 
Shotwell’s approach as an invaluable contribution to and 
resource for ongoing conversation in this area. Her critique 
of ethical individualism has helped me to appreciate more 
fully the challenges we face in proposing philosophically 
radical responses to complacency (in my own work) and 
purity politics (in hers). On a more practical level, I couldn’t 
agree more with Shotwell’s point that “we need some ways 
to imagine how we can keep working on things even when 
we realize that we can’t solve problems alone, and that 
we’re not innocent.”2 
As Shotwell recognizes, it is not enough to keep tugging at 
the individualistic roots of purism until the earth begins to 
give way. Unless more fertile seeds are planted in its place, 
individualism will continue crowding out surrounding 
sprouts, greedily soaking up all the sun and nourishing its 
purist fruits. As an alternative, Shotwell proposes what she 
calls a “distributed” or “social” approach to ethics. Rather 
than taking the individual person as its unit of analysis, a 
distributed approach would attend to multiple agents and 
agencies, organized into more or less elaborate networks 
of relationships. Such agents and agencies are capable 
of performing actions and carrying out procedures the 
elements of which are distributed across time and space. 
For those who adopt Shotwell’s proposed alternative, the 
most basic moral imperative becomes “to understand that 
we are placed in a particular context with particular limited 
capacities that are embedded in a big social operation with 
multiple players” (130). 
To illustrate what a distributed ethics might look like in 
practice, Shotwell draws our attention to Edwin Huchins’s 
celebrated book, Cognition in the Wild, in which he 
introduces the notion of “distributed cognition” by way of 
a compelling example.3 Consider how the crew of a large 
Navy ship manages to grasp the ship’s location relative to 
port while docking. No lone sailor is capable of carrying 
out this cognitive task on their own. To solve the routine 
problem of docking—not to mention the many, relatively 
predictable crises of maneuverability regularly foisted 
upon crews at sea—an elaborate ensemble of social and 
technical operations need to be carried out all at once, so 
cognitive processes end up manifesting themselves in a 
widely distributed manner. Indeed, the ship’s position is 
only ever “known” by an entire team of sailors geared onto 
multiple instruments simultaneously, in some cases for 
weeks and months on end. 
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Shotwell invites us to wonder: “Might we understand the 
ethics of complex of global systems in this way?” (129). 
The answer, of course, is “Yes!” 
. . . followed by a slightly hesitant, “But do you really mean, 
‘in this way’?” 
“WHAT’S MY WORK ON THE SHIP?” 
A great deal seems to hang on how seriously Shotwell 
wants us to take her analogy. Recall that the analogy 
Shotwell draws is between the shared predicament 
of a Navy ship’s crew, on the one hand, and our shared 
predicament aboard an imperial war machine of far greater 
magnitude, on the other. Arguing from the strengths of this 
analogy, she eventually concludes that “Our obligation, 
should we choose to accept it, is to do our work as 
individuals understanding that the meaning of our ethical 
actions is also political, and thus something that can only 
be understood in partial and incomplete ways” (130). 
I have to admit that I stumbled a bit over this conclusion. Yet 
when Shotwell invokes the language of “doing our work as 
individuals,” I take it that she is mostly just drawing out the 
implications of the analogy she is working with, and may or 
may not, upon reflection, want to focus on the question of 
what our obligations are as individuals—a question at the 
very heart of ethical individualism. I take it that Shotwell 
wants nothing to do with the questions animating such an 
approach to ethics. Here, then, are my questions for her: 
Does an alternative to ethical individualism still need to 
address the question of individual obligation? Or does a 
consistent and uncompromisingly social approach to ethics 
need to find ways to redirect, sidestep, or otherwise avoid 
this line of questioning? In other words, is there a way to 
avoid being compromised by ethical individualism and the 
epistemic priorities it presses upon us? Is such compromise 
merely contingent, or could it be constitutive of our very 
being as ethically reflective creatures, or of our practices of 
ethical reflection? 
Shotwell does acknowledge the limitations of her analogy, 
pointing out how it “fails at the point at which we ask where 
the ship (of nuclear energy use, or of eating) is going, and 
why” (130). Perhaps, then, she doesn’t mean for us to take 
it all that seriously. Notice, first, that the ship’s crew, as a 
collective agent, has a clearly delineated objective and, 
significantly, one that has been dictated from on high. Given 
the Navy’s chain of command, there is really no question 
as to where the ship is going, and why. Yet as Shotwell 
rightly points out, “Our ethical world is not a military—not a 
hierarchical structure; there’s no captain steering the way” 
(130). Unlike the question of where the Navy ship is going, 
the questions of where we are and ought to be going when 
it comes to the extraction and usage of energy sources are 
pressing, hotly contested, and not easily resolved to the 
satisfaction of all involved. 
Notice, second, that the ship’s crew has at its disposal 
certain well-rehearsed modes of collective action which, 
when mapped onto the oﬃcers’ objectives, generate 
what we might think of as a collective obligation to bring 
the ship to port. In the context of an established chain 
of command where decisions flow from the top down, 
it becomes possible for each sailor to think of their own 
responsibilities, qua individuals, in terms derived from 
the responsibilities of the crew, qua collective agent. 
Incidentally, this is precisely the sort of analysis of 
collective responsibility that Tracy Isaacs elaborates in her 
2011 book, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. 
According to Isaacs, “when collective action solutions 
come into focus and potential collective agents with 
relatively clear identities emerge as the subjects of those 
actions, then we may understand individual obligations . . . 
as flowing from collective obligations that those potential 
agents would have.”4 “Clarity at the collective level is a 
prerequisite for collective obligation in these cases,” she 
explains further, “and that clarity serves as a lens through 
which the obligations of individuals come into focus.”5 
What I want to suggest, then, is that precisely in virtue 
of its limitations, Shotwell’s analogy helps to illuminate a 
significant challenge: namely, the challenge of recognizing 
that and how certain organizational forms work to entrench, 
rather than overcome, an individualistic orientation 
to the world. What Shotwell’s analogy (and Isaacs’s 
analysis of collective responsibility) shows, I think, is that 
hierarchically structured organizations help to instill in 
us an illusory sense of clarity concerning our obligations 
as individuals—definitively settling the question of what 
we are responsible for doing and for whom in a way that 
relieves us of the need to think through such matters 
for and amongst ourselves. Hierarchical, authoritarian 
structures are particularly adept at fostering such deceptive 
clarity, for in and through our participation in them we are 
continually taught to expect straightforward answers to the 
question of individual obligation, and such expectations 
are continually met by our superiors. Shotwell’s analogy 
helps us see that expecting straightforward answers goes 
hand in hand with living in authoritarian contexts and that 
ethical individualism will continue to thrive in such contexts, 
significantly complicating the task of uprooting it. 
“WHERE’S THE SHIP HEADING, ANYWAY?” 
Recall that Shotwell ends up putting the Navy ship analogy 
into question because, as she puts it, “Our ethical world 
is not a military—not a hierarchical structure” (130). While 
I agree that, in our world, “there is no captain steering the 
way,” I also wonder whether it might be worth staying with 
the trouble of this analogy a bit longer to see if it might 
help shed light on our current predicament in other ways. 
In the most recent book-length publication of the Zapatista 
Army for National Liberation (EZLN), there is a delightful 
series of stories borrowed “From the Notebook of the Cat-
Dog”—stories which, we are warned, are “very other.”6 In 
one such story, called “The Ship,” we are invited to imagine 
the following scenario: 
A ship. A big one, as if it were a nation, a continent, an 
entire planet. With all of its crew and its hierarchies, 
that is, its above and its below. There are disputes 
over who commands, who is more important, who 
has the most—the standard debates that occur 
everywhere there is an above and a below. But this 
proud ship was having diﬃculty, moving without 
clear direction and with water pouring in from both 
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sides. As tends to happen in these cases, the cadre 
of oﬃcers insisted that the captain be relieved of 
his duty. As complicated as things tend to be when 
determined by those above, it was decided that 
in eﬀect, the captain’s moment has passed and 
it is necessary to name a new one. The oﬃcers 
debated among themselves, disputing who has 
more merit, who is better, who is the best.7 
Who, we might add, is the most pur et dur? As the story 
continues, we learn that the majority of the ship’s crew live 
and work unseen, below the water line. “In no uncertain 
terms, the ship moves thanks to their work”; and yet, “none 
of this matters to the owner of the ship who, regardless 
of who is named captain, is only interested in assuring 
that the ship produce, transport, and collect commodities 
across the oceans.”8 
The Zapatista’s use of this analogy interests me because 
of the way it forces us to face certain structural features 
of our constitutive present. In a sense, there really is a 
captain steering the ship of energy use, or of eating—or 
better, it doesn’t matter who is at the helm, so long as the 
ship owner’s bidding is done. The ship really is heading 
in one way rather than another, so the crew have their 
“work as individuals” cut out for them. And as the narrator 
explains, “despite the fact that it is those below who are 
making it possible for the ship to sail, that it is they who 
are producing not only the things necessary for the ship 
to function, but also the commodities that give the ship 
its purpose and destiny, those people below have nothing 
other than their capacity and knowledge to do this work.” 
Unlike the oﬃcers up above, those living and working 
below “don’t have the possibility of deciding anything 
about the organization of this work so that it may fulfill 
their objectives.”9 Especially for those who are set apart 
for being very other—Loas Otroas, who are “dirty, ugly, 
bad, poorly spoken, and worst of all . . . didn’t comb their 
hair”10—everyday practices of responsibility are organized 
much as they are in the military. Finally, and crucially, the 
crew’s practices of responsibility really, already are widely 
distributed across space and time. 
If we take Shotwell’s analogy seriously, then, we are 
confronted with a second challenge: namely, that 
of acknowledging the inadequacy of alternatives to 
individualism that are merely formal in character. Reflecting 
on Shotwell’s proposed alternative to individualism, I now 
want to ask, is it enough to adopt a distributed approach 
to ethics? Are we not already working collaboratively, often 
as participants in projects the aims and outcomes of which 
are needlessly, horrifyingly destructive? And have our roles 
in such projects not already been distributed—our labors 
already thoroughly divided and specialized—such that 
each of us finds ourselves narrowly focused on making our 
own little contributions in our own little corners? What does 
it mean to call for a distributed approach to ethics from 
here, if we are already there? 
“WHAT DID UNA OTROA SEE?” 
Thus far Shotwell’s analogy has helped us come to grips 
with two significant diﬃculties. First of all, it turns out that 
organizing ourselves with a view to acting collectively is 
not necessarily a good thing, nor is it necessarily an anti-
individualist thing. Seeing as how certain organizational 
forms help to foster and reinforce an individualistic 
orientation to the world, it seems misleading to treat 
collectivist and individualist approaches to ethics as simple 
opposites. Second, it turns out that adopting a distributed 
approach is not necessarily a good thing either. Seeing as 
how our current practices of responsibility already manifest 
themselves in a distributed manner, without those of us 
living below having the possibility of deciding much 
of anything about the organization of work, proposing 
merely formal alternatives to individualism might very well 
encourage more of the same, while at best drawing our 
attention to the current division of labor. 
Taken together, these diﬃculties point to the need to 
propose an alternative to ethical individualism that is not 
merely formal, but also politically contentful. Such an 
alternative would go beyond oﬀering up new destinations 
for the ship of extraction, production, consumption, and 
waste—after all, that’s the sort of thing a new captain could 
do. Instead, it would aid us in building new organizational 
forms in which the entire crew are able to participate 
in deciding the organization of our work. A genuine 
alternative would also aid us in resisting the temptation 
to project authoritarian forms, with all the illusory clarity 
in responsibilities they tend to instill. Simply put, what we 
anti-individualists ought to be for is not just a distributed 
approach to ethics, or an ethics of impurity, but an impure, 
anti-authoritarian ethics. Besides, I can see no better way 
to meet the third challenge confronting us: that of avoiding 
organizational forms that foster purism at the collective 
level. 
With this third challenge in mind, I want to conclude by 
considering what might be involved in “creating a place 
from which to see,” as opposed to “creating a political 
party or an organization” (8). 
As the Zapatista’s telling of the ship continues, our attention 
is drawn to the predicament of the story’s protagonist, una 
otroa. Loas Otroas were always cursing the oﬃcers and 
“getting into mischief,” organizing rebellion after rebellion 
and calling upon the others down below to join them. 
Unfortunately, “the great majority of those below did not 
respond to this call.”11 Many would even applaud when the 
oﬃcers singled out individual rebels, took them on deck, 
and forced them to walk the plank as part of an elaborate 
ritual of power. Then one time, when yet another was 
singled out, something out of the ordinary happened: 
The dispute among the oﬃcers over who would be 
captain had created so much noise and chaos that 
no one had bothered to serve up the usual words 
of praise for order, progress, and fine dining. The 
executioner, accustomed to acting according to 
habit, didn’t know what to do; something was 
missing. So he went to look for some oﬃcer who 
would comply with what tradition dictated. In order 
to do so without the accused/judged/condemned 
escaping, he sent them to hell, that is, to the 
“lookout,” also known as “the Crow’s Nest.”12 
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High atop the tallest mast, the Crow’s Nest furnished una 
otroa with a unique vantage point from which to examine 
afresh all the activities on deck. For example, in a game 
periodically staged by the oﬃcers, the sailors would be 
asked to choose from two stages full of little, diﬀerently 
colored flags, and the color chosen by the majority would 
be used to paint the body of the ship. Of course, at some 
level the entire crew knew that the outcome of the game 
would not really change anything about life on the ship, 
for the ship’s owner, and its destination, would remain the 
same regardless. But from the angle and distance of the 
Crow’s Nest, it finally dawned on Loa Otroa that “all the 
stages have the same design and the same color” too.13 
The lookout also provided its occupant with an unrivaled 
view of the horizon, where “enemies were sighted, 
unknown vessels were caught creeping up, monsters and 
catastrophes were seen coming, and prosperous ports 
where commodities (that is, people) were exchanged came 
into view.”14 Depending on what threats and opportunities 
were reported, the captain and his oﬃcers would either 
make a toast, or celebrate modernity, or postmodernity 
(depending on the fashion), or distribute pamphlets with 
little tidbits of advice, like, “Change begins with oneself,” 
which, we are told “almost no one read.”15 Simply put, the 
totality of life aboard the ship was fundamentally irrational 
and absurd. 
Upon being banished to the subsidiary of hell that is the 
Crow’s Nest, we are told that Loa Otroa “did not wallow in 
self-pity.” Instead, “they took advantage of this privileged 
position to take a look,” and it “was no small thing what 
their gaze took in.”16 Looking first toward the deck, then 
pausing for a moment to notice the bronze engraving on 
the front of the boat (‘Bellum Semper. Universum Bellum. 
Universum Exitium’), Loa Otroa looked out over the horizon, 
and “shuddered and sharpened their gaze to confirm what 
they had seen.”17 
After hurriedly returning to the bottom of the ship, Loa Otroa
scrawled some “incomprehensible signs” in a notebook 
and showed them to the others, who looked at each other, 
back at the notebook, and to each other again, “speaking a 
very ancient language.”18 
Finally, “after a little while like that, exchanging gazes and 
words, they began to work feverishly. The End.”19 
“THE END?” 
Frustrating, right?! “What do you mean ‘the end’? What 
did they see from the lookout? What did they draw in the 
notebook? What did they talk about? Then what happened?” 
The Cat-Dog just meowed barking, “We don’t know yet.”20 
I wonder: What lessons could such frustration hold for we 
aspiring anti-individualists and anti-purists? Which of our 
expectations and needs does the story’s narrator avoid 
meeting, or neglect to meet? Where are we met with a 
provocation in the place of hoped-for consolation? 
What might our own experiences of frustration have to 
teach us about what we have come to expect of ethical 
theory, and how we understand the relationship between 
theory and the “feverish work” of organizing? What stories 
are we telling ourselves and others about our own cognitive 
needs—about their origins, energies, and sources of 
satisfaction? From, with, and to whom do we find ourselves 
looking, and for what? Who all has a hand in creating this
“place from which to see” (8)? “Who is it that is doing the 
seeing?” (5, original emphasis). 
One final thought from the EZLN, this time from a chapter 
called “More Seedbeds”: 
We say that it doesn’t matter that we are tired, 
at least we have been focused on the storm that 
is coming. We may be tired of searching and of 
working, and we may very well be woken up by 
the blows that are coming, but at least in that case 
we will know what to do. But only those who are 
organized will know what to do.21 
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Response to Critics 
Alexis Shotwell 
CARLETON UNIVERSITY 
Participating in an author-meets-critics (AMC) panel is 
peculiar—there is an artifact, a book, which can’t be 
changed. And then there is rich and generative conversation, 
which illuminates the vitality and ongoing changefulness of 
why one thinks about things and writes books about them. 
Still, perhaps still images of moving objects are all we ever 
have, in trying to understand the world. In the AMC at the 
Central APA, where these folks first shared their responses 
to Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times, 
this texture felt especially heightened, in part because 
of the quality of the responses and in part because the 
conversation in the room from participants beyond the 
panel was enormously rich and interesting. Several of us 
commented afterwards on how nourishing it felt to have 
a wide-ranging, feminist, politically complex conversation 
that refused to confine itself to disciplinary habits within 
philosophy. I am grateful to the hard work that went into 
putting on the Central APA, to the North American Society 
for Social Philosophy for hosting this book panel, to Ami for 
organizing it, and to Mike, Kate, and Mark for their generous 
and provoking responses. I am still thinking through their 
engagements, and the reflection below is only a beginning. 
I am struck by a shared curiosity among all three responses 
about the relationship between individuals and social 
relations, between people and our world, especially 
around the question of how we transform this unjust world 
that has shaped us. I share this curiosity—in Against Purity
I am especially interested in what we gain from beginning 
from the orientation that we are implicated in the world 
in all its mess, rather than attempting to stand apart from 
it. I’ve been thinking through what it means to take up an 
attitude that might intertwine epistemic humility with a 
will to keep trying to transform the world even after we 
have made tremendous mistakes or if we are beneficiaries 
of oppressions we oppose. Epistemic humility asks of 
us (among other things) that we not imagine we can be 
completely correct about things, and a will to keep trying 
demands that we find ways to be of use without being 
perfect. Underlying this attitude is a belief in the possibility 
of transforming the extant world while refusing to sacrifice 
anyone in service of the envisioned world-to-come—as 
Mark discusses, this is an anarchist understanding of 
prefigurative politics. I am compelled by his account of 
prefiguration as a useable pivot point from recognizing 
impurity towards shaping strategy. And, indeed, thinking 
clearly about prefiguration invites us to consider the 
question of how capacity building in our social relations 
might be in tension with eﬃciency. I’ve learned so much 
from social movement theorist-practitioners who take up 
an essentially pedagogical approach to working on and 
with the world. Many of the movements Mark mentions 
have helped me think, too, about one of the key points in 
his response—the question of dialectics of struggle. Many 
of us feel a pull in thinking about prefiguration to idealize 
or stabilize a vision of the world we want—and I believe 
in having explicit and explicated normative commitments 
in engaging political work. If we want to change anything, 
we should be able to say what we want, and why, and we 
should have some ways to evaluate whether we’re winning 
the fights we take on—this is part of my own commitment 
to prefigurative political practice. I am still working through 
what it means theoretically to understand something 
that activists understand in practice: The victories we win 
become the conditions of our future struggles. In this sense, 
social transformation is never accomplished. In the session, 
I shared an example of this from an oral history project on 
the history of AIDS activism that I have been doing over the 
last five years. In 1990, there was a widespread move in 
Canada towards legislation that would allow Public Health 
to quarantine people living with HIV and AIDS; in some 
provinces this was defeated (in BC such legislation passed 
but was not enacted). At the time, activists argued that if 
people were transmitting HIV to others on purpose, it would 
be appropriate for this to be a matter for the legal system 
rather than a matter of health policy. At the time, this was a 
strategic move that allowed people to eﬀectively mobilize 
against forced quarantine; now, Canada is, shamefully, 
one of the world leaders in imprisoning people simply 
for being HIV positive. The victories of the past become 
the conditions of struggle in the present, and if we regard 
that as only a problem we might become immobilized. 
Instead, a prefigurative approach encourages us to take a 
grounded, emergent attitude toward our work. How can we 
create ways forward even when what we win is incomplete 
or reveals problems we had not considered? 
Prefiguration involves, complexly, the concerns about 
voluntarism that Kate raises. As Kate notes, in Against Purity
I discuss fellow feminists’ work on questions of gender 
transformation and voluntarism, rather than turning to 
trans-hating thinkers. This is in part because as a matter of 
method I prefer to attend to people who I think are doing 
good and interesting work in the world, rather than people 
who are both intellectually vacuous and politically vile (and 
I have spent some fair amount of time considering the 
views of trans-hating writers in trying to suss out what their 
opposition to gender transformation tells us about their 
understanding of gender1). But it is the case that the main 
source of charges of gender voluntarism come from anti-
trans writers who consider themselves to be in opposition 
to it. So as a conceptual term, it is strange to define “gender 
voluntarism,” since it’s something that is almost entirely 
used in a derogatory sense. Thus, in trying to evaluate 
whether transforming gender is voluntarist in the relevant 
sense, I certainly gloss, and perhaps oversimplify, a view 
that holds, as I put it in the book, “individuals can change 
themselves and their political circumstances through their 
own force of will.”2 
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